

3/4/63

Facts for John McCone to emphasize from President's standpoint:

1. President authorized every overflight requested.
2. Acting DCI accepted for CIA responsibility for arranging necessary overflights.
3. Intelligence Community did not report any evidence of missiles to the President before flight of October 14. What the Intelligence Community had was a handful of reports which were subjected to photographic verification; hundreds of previous reports had been tested in the same way. The difference is that this time the test proved positive.
4. There was no report of concern because of weather delay to either the DCI or the White House.
5. The President has obtained full reports on this whole matter both from Mr. McCone and from the Intelligence Advisory Board.
6. The President may want to emphasize that Mr. McCone should be extremely careful in criticism of Sec/State request for a rescheduling of September flights into four shorter ones. There was no reclama of this -- and no report to anyone that it was leading to delay.
7. Restrictions on publication:

The most important was over DCI's own orders of May and August 1962 -- "as it came to be interpreted" see DCI report, page 49.

*Why be worried for D*  
*Kennedy - why be worried for D*  
*Third copy this*